Abstract
It is generally accepted that the defaults of large systemically important banks can cause negative externalities to the surrounding economies and there is thus a need to reduce excessive risk taking within these banks. The dissertation aims to develop a theoretical model on how board governance in systemic banks could be structured and regulated in order to reduce risk appetite, and to lower the probability of systemic instability in the banking sector. The model utilizes the board as a mechanism to merge the interests of shareholders and creditors in terms of risk appetite. Creditors are used as a proxy for representing the interests of the wider set of risk-averse stakeholders. The dissertation will shed more light to a topic that has both practical and academic relevance, namely the implications of different regulatory regimes for the risk appetite of banks. The developed model will provide an alternative approach for managing systemic risk and should stimulate further academic discussion around the role of the board in integrating the risk preferences of different stakeholders.
About Roni Laakso
Roni Laakso is a doctoral candidate at the University of Helsinki, Faculty of Law. Prior to starting his doctoral studies, he worked in different roles at Nordea Bank, including as Head of Audit in Group Internal Audit and as legal counsel in the fund management company of the bank. Before joining Nordea he held managerial roles at PwC and Deloitte. Roni is a Certified Internal Auditor, an Authorized Public Accountant, and holds degrees in accounting and finance (B.Sc. and M.Sc.), Real estate economics (M.Sc.), and International and Comparative Law (LL.M.).
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