Who the hell is coming now?

In his dissertation ‘Who the hell is coming now? Correctional work in an extraordinary critical situation’, Knut Mellingsæter Sørensen looks at how Ila Prison as an organisation and community of colleagues, as well as individual actors, reacted to the new, important tasks they were given just a few days after the terrorist attack.

A key point in the dissertation is that The Imprisonment of the terrorist represented something completely new and something the Norwegian Correctional Service had not dealt with before.

Unknown situation for the correctional service

The Imprisonment was about putting in place a sound security structure where Breivik could not escape and continue the terrorist acts he had committed.

“It was an unknown situation for which there were no contingency plans. New solutions had to be found immediately. These organisational innovations that were implemented and how they played out in practice are what this dissertation is about.

I have chosen to use ‘The Imprisonment’ as a proper noun to describe the ongoing state of emergency that occurred and lasted for two years,” says Sørensen.

The situation was extraordinary because it wasn’t covered by any type of contingency or crisis management plans.

“What happened was beyond Ila’s horizon of understanding. It was not an ‘ordinary’ event. It was a situation one really hadn’t imagined, nor did it resemble the most unlikely situation one could imagine,” says Sørensen.

The established and prevailing correctional practices and prison officer culture in Norway – where attempts are made to change and rehabilitate inmates – no longer covered this Imprisonment. Up until now, the trend has been to build so-called village prisons and not high security prisons. The new situation changed all that.

Flexibility to safeguard society

“There was a great fear that something would go wrong. There were fears of escape, outside attacks, hostage-taking and other unforeseen events. At that time, Ila Prison was not designed for such a situation and it was important that confidential information did not leak out. This had to be addressed at the time of incarceration,” says Sørensen.

There wasn’t much time and security measures had to be put in place quickly.

In order to prepare and implement security measures around The Imprisonment, a special coordination group consisting of prison managers was established. As a result, managers decided to skip key levels such as region, director and inspector when various decisions were to be made.

At the same time, formal measures were also taken. The management created a particularly high security regime and handpicked a prison officer group. They also transferred tasks from other occupational groups at Ila to the prison officers in the high security regime.

Sørensen says that the established structures in the organisation were disconnected and tasks were transferred to the prison-educated ‘blue-clad’ officers who worked with The Imprisonment. Blue-clad officers are those who work in uniformed positions at the prison and who had a special security responsibility – as opposed to the civilian employees.

“This was done because it was the job of the blue-clad officers to ensure safety, and they were considered more reliable than other staff members,” says Sørensen.

The dissertation highlights the point that a bureaucratic-hierarchical line organisation is too rigid to deal situations where time is short. When an extraordinary critical situation needed to be dealt with, such an organisation presented challenges.

Changed self-understanding among the prison officers

The organisational changes that took place in Ila Prison from an ordinary closed security wing to a Particularly High Security regime also changed the prison officers’ self-understanding. Traditionally, the prison officers’ work has had a relational and caring character, but the new regime meant they were no longer supposed to talk to Breivik.

“The prison officers were socially disciplined and their usual dynamic way of performing their roles was strictly limited. They were also socially isolated from the rest of the colleague community at Ila. They were shut out of important arenas for professional reflection and discussion,” says Sørensen.

Sørensen also highlights how the prison officers who worked with Breivik went to great lengths to maintain their professionalism at work.

“In their spare time, they avoided distressing impressions related to the 22 July attacks that could evoke emotional reactions. For example, they avoided TV coverage and social media posts about the terrorist attack and declined to attend the ‘rose march’. And with regard to the impressions they were unable to avoid, they had to process them mentally in order to work with The Imprisonment,” says Sørensen.

As a result, Sørensen provides insight into how prison officers working with high-profile inmates who have committed particularly serious crimes go to great lengths to treat inmates in a humane and fair manner.

Read also:

• Fengslingen etter terrorangrepene 22. juli 2011 (project description in Norwegian)
• Knut skrev doktorgrad om 22. juli-fengslingen (interview in Norwegian)